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W ojciech Cellary’s remarkson decision making andintelligence in Com-puter’s September 2003
issue (“The Profession’s
Role in the Global Information Soci-
ety,” pp. 124, 122-123) brought to
mind Bob Colwell’s “Engineering
Decisions” column (Computer, Aug.
2003, pp. 9-11) and my disappoint-
ment with Adrian Hopgood’s article,
“Artificial Intelligence: Hype or Real-
ity?” (Computer, May 2003, pp. 24-
28). Shortly afterward, under the Arti-
ficial Intelligence heading in the book
review section of the May 2003 issue
of American Scientist, I found descrip-
tions of two books on the chess-play-
ing computer, Deep Blue, as well as a
book on the “sociable” robot, Kismet.
When the September 2003 special issue
of Scientific American titled “Better
Brains: How Neuroscience Will
Enhance You” arrived the same day, I
felt pressed to move in a predestinate
groove. Although I previously had
resolved not to revisit the topic I cov-
ered in “The Myth of the Intelligent
Computer” (Computer, July 1997, p.
8), the omens seemed to dictate an
about-face.
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
The term artificial intelligence suf-
fers from many problems beyond the
ugliness of its initialism. Hopgood
found their nub with his observation
“If AI were named ‘nifty computer
programs,’ it would surely be hailed an
unqualified success,” but treated it as
a mere throwaway line.
The term’s adoption specifically
implies that we see ourselves as creat-
ing in machines an intelligence roughly
equivalent to natural intelligence. The
many aspects of natural intelligence
that dictionaries define boil down to
its being an essential element of suc-
cessful behavior, especially social
behavior.
As computing professionals, we
have a moral duty to maintain and
promote a distinction between the
machines we use as tools and the peo-
ple whose purposes and well-being we
support. People behave or misbehave.
Machines function or malfunction.
Functioning does not exhibit intelli-
gence. Any inferred intelligence should
be credited to the machine’s designers.
Society judges our competence as
computing professionals by the claims
we make for ourselves. If we claim to
be creating intelligence, people will
assume we claim also to understand
what intelligence is. Yet the evidence
shows that we don’t understand it.
This last point affects three groups
of people differently. The computing
profession in general, unsuspecting of
its self-deceit, will have unrealistic
expectations and transmit them to the
other groups. People who have not
thought much about intelligence will
be led into unreasonable hopes and
fears. People who have thought deeply
about intelligence will consider the
computing profession to be both arro-
gant and ignorant.
In the computing world, the phrase
artificial intelligence has a long history,
quite untinged with arrogance. But I
can’t help feeling that a great deal of
ignorance has sustained its use.
NATURAL INTELLIGENCE
The misunderstanding of intelli-
gence among computing people
springs from the grossly simplified
model we use. Hopgood opens his sur-
vey with a section titled “A Spectrum
of Intelligent Behavior.” The text bases
this supposed spectrum on “level of
understanding involved,” while the
accompanying figure shows the range,
with reaction at one end and expertise
at the other. This widely adopted
model is uncompromisingly unidi-
mensional. AI people measure its suc-
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trates on the production of food
by workers using their bodily-
kinesthetic intelligence. The adop-
tion of agricultural machinery
greatly diminished the role of
agrarian workers. 
• The industrial society exploits
spatial intelligence and concen-
trates on the production of phys-
ical artifacts by workers using
their bodily-kinesthetic intelli-
gence. The adoption of digitally
controlled machinery greatly
diminished the role of industrial
workers.
• The information society exploits
logical-mathematical intelligence
and concentrates on the produc-
tion of representational artifacts
by clerical and other office work-
ers using their bodily-kinesthetic
intelligence. The adoption of dig-
ital computers and telecommuni-
cations has already diminished the
role of information workers.
These generalizations display a pat-
tern in which successive reformations
of society change the role that many 
of its members play within it. These
reformations hinge on the increasing
importance of the artifacts that new
technology enables the new society to 
produce.
Two kinds of representational arti-
facts characterize the information soci-
ety: those for sale as goods and those
used in the production of goods. This is
why the commercial world so eagerly
seeks and defends copyright and patent
monopolies in our information age.
Thus, all the most significant intelli-
gences in the pageant of societies are
of the object-related kind. When, in
cess by how far along that spectrum
research has advanced.
But intelligence is not unidimen-
sional. Harvard neuropsychologist
Howard Gardner put forth a far more
realistic, multidimensional view of
intelligence 20 years ago in his book,
Frames of Mind (Basic Books, 1983).
His model remains widely accepted, if
sometimes misunderstood. In the pref-
ace to his book’s 1985 paperback edi-
tion, Gardner defined an intelligence
as “the ability to solve problems, or to
create products, that are valued within
one or more cultural settings.”
Using a variety of evidence, Gardner
proposed seven relatively independent
dimensions of intelligence, although he
has since adopted an eighth and con-
templates a ninth (www.pz.harvard.
edu/pl/HG_MI_after_20_years.pdf).
On the basis of rich evidence, he con-
cludes that “all human beings possess
not just a single intelligence (often
called ‘g’ for general intelligence).
Rather, as a species we human beings
are better described as having a set of
relatively autonomous intelligences.”
The seven original intelligences com-
prise three “object-related” dimen-
sions—spatial, logical-mathematical,
and bodily-kinesthetic; two “object-
free” dimensions—linguistic and musi-
cal; and two cultural dimensions—
intrapersonal and interpersonal. The
eighth is naturalist, which I would take
to be object-related, although it might
be considered cultural in that it focuses
particularly on relations with animals.
IQ tests usually measure spatial and
logical-mathematical intelligences.
Artificial intelligence is primarily logi-
cal-mathematical.
INTELLIGENT MACHINES?
Cellary reviews the imminent global
information society in terms of the pre-
ceding industrial and agrarian societies.
We can extend this approach by looking
at the different societies in terms of the
intelligences most significant to them:
• The agrarian society exploits nat-
uralist intelligence and concen-
one society, many workers need to use
such intelligences, in the next society
machinery and technology hugely
amplify the object-related capabilities
of such workers. For example, it once
took hundreds of agrarian workers to
do by hand what one driver can do
now with a tractor and harvester.
Likewise, it once took hundreds of
industrial workers to machine the
engine block castings that one machine
supervised by two or three people can
now do. Today, machines built with
credit card, barcode, and related tech-
nologies have already taken over many
of the information workers’ tasks.
Although it’s appropriate to use
machines in this way simply because
they’re more effective, this doesn’t
make the machines intelligent. Cellary
disagrees, defining human intelligence
“as the ability to use accrued knowl-
edge to make correct decisions.” This
leads him to the following observations
regarding the information society:
“Computers deprived humans of their
monopoly on intelligence. Although
they can only capture a fraction of their
programmers’ real intelligence, com-
puters make correct decisions based on
the knowledge encapsulated in the pro-
grams they run.”
I contend that computers don’t make
decisions, they compute results by
deterministic logical-mathematical
means. Deep Blue could play chess bet-
ter than almost everyone, but it 
didn’t make decisions, it computed
moves. Granted, this is only a technical
point, but Colwell makes a more fun-
damental point about logical decisions,
computer-aided or otherwise: “Do not
apply your outstanding logic deduc-
tion talents to a problem involving
other people and expect to be thanked
for it. Personal relationships are in a
special category in which your hard-
won engineering skills are a severe lia-
bility.”
SOCIAL MACHINES?
We benefit from applying our object-
related intelligences. Machines can
carry out many object-related tasks
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our daily lives. Machines belong to
people and don’t have lives. Maybe in
a century or two we will craft Asimov-
style androids that truly deserve the
adjective intelligent. But why would we
want them?
W hether the computing profes-sion is ill-informed about nat-ural intelligence or not, there
are good arguments for dropping the
term artificial intelligence as a name for
the nifty programming field. The
Oxford English Dictionary, second edi-
tion (www.oed.com), defines algorist as
a descriptor for a nifty programmer, but
deems the word obsolete.
Here, then, we have a word ripe for
reanimation. The derived term, algo-
ristics, would make a highly suitable
replacement for artificial intelligence,
being more correct historically than the
corrupt algorithmics.
Placing this renamed field alongside
statistics and logistics, as a branch of
mathematics, would benefit the com-
puting profession greatly. Given that
algoristic techniques are highly math-
ematical and require a much greater
degree of mathematical knowledge
than ordinary programming, they
should be taught and studied primarily
by mathematicians.
Further, a detailed knowledge of
algoristics offers no particular benefit
to the computing profession at large:
The advanced and intricate algorithms
professional algorists will discover
could easily be coded into software as
calls to library subprograms or, in the
Java jargon, classes. We should, there-
fore, bequeath algoristics to the math-
ematicians and be done with it. 
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much better than we can, but that
doesn’t make the machines intelligent.
What about the other intelligences
that characterize humans? The two
object-free intelligences, linguistic and
musical, are especially interesting
because they focus on representations—
as does digital technology. The success
of digital speech recognition and digital
music might suggest that computers
have object-free intelligences. But the
roles of humans and machines in these
areas differ markedly. People use lan-
guage and music to communicate their
beliefs, ideas, and emotions; machines
can’t communicate beliefs, ideas, or
emotions because they don’t have any.
They have only digital representations,
that is, data.
The two cultural dimensions, intrap-
ersonal and interpersonal, lie at the
heart of human intelligence because
they play the most important role in
our being effective members of society
and interacting beneficially with other
people. Where in this picture does
Kismet, the sociable robot, fit?
Kismet consists of a head covered by
something that looks a bit like a face. A
computer can move the face’s features
to make “eye contact” and display a
variety of emotions, its developers
claim. Yet Kismet can’t have emotions,
so its display is mere mimicry. This is
not to say that such robots might not
be useful to us. Robotic pets of various
kinds are already popular, and social
mimicry can be highly effective. For
example, during artificial intelligence’s
early days, a program called Eliza
became popular. A Teletype terminal
served as Eliza’s interface, and the pro-
gram appeared to engage in conversa-
tion by giving simple greetings and
asking extremely simple questions,
based on keywords selected from what
the user typed in. Back then, some peo-
ple found “talking” to Eliza a com-
pelling experience.
Yet decades later, machines still have
far to go before they truly can interact
with people intelligently. Our intelli-
gence reflects our cultural and social
experiences and the events that shape
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